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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940083-CA 
v, : 
MICHAEL B. QUICK, : Category No- 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted 
murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-203 (Cum. Supp. 1994), in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond 
S. Uno, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence? 
A trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial on 
the basis of newly discovered evidence is reviewed for "abuse of 
discretion" or "reasonability." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 
545 (Utah 1994); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); 
State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Did the trial court properly allow the victim to 
display the location of his injuries to the jury under rule 403, 
Utah Rules of Evidence? 
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 
under rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, is also reviewed for 
"abuse of discretion" or "reasonability." State v. White, No. 
930696-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. August 17, 1994); State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). See also State v. 
Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5-6 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1270 n.ll (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and 
rules are set forth in Addendum A.-
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Cum. Supp. 1994) 
Utah R. Evid. 4 03 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with attempted murder, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Cum. 
Supp. 1994) (R. 8). A jury found defendant guilty (R. 77-78, 
144-45). On October 18, 1993, defendant was sentenced to the 
Utah State Prison for a term of one to fifteen years, with a 
consecutive zero to five year firearm enhancement, in addition to 
fines, fees, and restitution (R. 149-50). Defendant now appeals 
his conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Shooting 
Defendant shot Frank Connelly three times while Frank 
was sitting in a vehicle in front of the Pax Company, where 
defendant worked (R. 405-10, 428-32) . 
A few months before, defendant had arrived in Salt Lake 
City and rented a room under the name of James Morris (R. 24 0-44, 
693). Two weeks later, to save money, defendant moved into a 
room with Terry Stevens (R. 245, 254-55). Defendant stole 
Terry's social security card, birth certificate, and 
identification card (R. 256-57, 371-74, 738-42), and used Terry's 
identity to obtain a driver's license, a post office box, and 
employment as a laborer with Pax Company (R. 267-68, 281-85, 299, 
321-24, 738-42). 
Still using Terry Stevens' name, defendant set up an 
elaborate scam. He placed an advertisement in local newspapers 
which stated: 
VICE PRESIDENT. Fortune 500 company seeks 
prominent individual for Vice-President of 
Sales. Management of 500-plus employees in 
72 offices in United States and abroad. Must 
be able to make decisions that involve 
millions of dollars in contracts for the 
company. This person must be able to deal 
with high-ranking military personnel and 
government officials. Extensive travel 
abroad for the first year. Position includes 
six-figure income, stock options, 401K, 
medical and dental, company car, expense 
account, use of company plane. Candidate 
must possess a four-year degree, minimum five 
years sales experience, five years management 
in sales or marketing. Must be able to pass 
background and credit investigation. 
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(R. 219-20, 333, 336-37, 340, 703-4). Defendant claimed his plan 
was to attract well-to-do persons with the advertisement, offer 
them the phony job, charge them $2 00 for a "security 
investigation," and pocket the money (R. 703-4). 
At least two people responded to the ad. One was Diane 
Poland, who received a call a couple of weeks after she had sent 
in her resume (R. 345-46). She was told to come to the Little 
America Hotel in Salt Lake at 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. on March 1, 1993 
(R. 347). She met with defendant, who gave her a business card 
with the name "T. L. Stevens," interviewed her in detail and gave 
her the impression she might be hired, not for the advertised 
job, but for a related position (R. 348-54, 704-5). He said he 
would call her the following Wednesday, but she never heard from 
him again (R. 354, 356). 
At approximately 11:00 a.m., as Ms. Poland was leaving, 
Frank Connelly, who had also responded to the ad, was arriving 
for his interview with "T. L. Stevens" (R. 355, 359, 385-87, 704-
5, 709). Connelly had worked for 25 years in sporting goods 
marketing and management, and was in the process of leaving 
Allied Development Company after four and a half years as General 
Merchandise Manager (R. 382-83, 424-25, 450-51). Connelly's 
interview with defendant was similar to Ms. Poland's (R. 390-93). 
Defendant called him later that day and told him he had the job 
(R. 394) . Defendant further requested that Connelly drive him 
out to the airport that night (R. 395). 
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At 7:00 p.m., Connelly picked up defendant at the hotel 
(R. 3 98). Defendant requested they stop off at Pax Company, 
where he claimed he had left some papers (R. 3 95, 4 02). 
When Connelly stopped in front of the Pax building, 
defendant began to exit the passenger door, turned around, and 
shot Connelly (R. 402-5). The first bullet hit Connelly's right 
arm, shattering his elbow (R. 405, 522). The second struck him 
in the top of the head, as he was leaning toward the passenger 
door (R. 406-7, 483-84). He then used his left hand to retrieve 
a gun he carried in an ankle holster (R. 408-9).x When 
defendant saw Connelly's gun, he fired a third time, backed away, 
and apparently ran off (R. 4 09-11). The third shot entered 
Connelly's right breast and exited from the lower left stomach 
area (R. 410, 522). Connelly fell out of the vehicle through the 
passenger door, got up and circled to the driver's door, and 
drove the vehicle to a service station, where the police were 
called (R. 411, 415-16). 
At various points during his testimony, Connelly showed 
the jury the scars from the bullet wounds (R. 407, 420, 428-30). 
When he was asked to undo his shirt to show the abdominal scars, 
defense counsel objected, but the court allowed the jury to see 
Connelly's gun had a clip loaded with five rounds, but 
required a two-handed cocking action before it would fire. Because 
his right elbow was shattered, he was not able to cock or fire it 
(R. 410) . Testing showed that neither the bullet removed from 
Connelly nor the three empty casings found at the scene were fired 
by his gun (R. 591-94, 600). 
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the location of those scars as well (R. 428-30, 444-45, Addendum 
C) . 
B. Motion for New Trial 
After the trial, defendant discovered that a fill-in-
the-blank form dated June 3, 1993, titled "Application for 
Hearing," had been filed with the Utah Industrial Commission 
nearly three months before defendant's trial (R. 866-68). The 
form was signed by Connelly and, where it requests a description 
of the "accident and resulting injuries," the following statement 
is typed, "I was shot three (3) timeswhile [sic] interviewing 
with some people as part of my job with Allied" (R. 162; the form 
is attached as Addendum B). 
On its face the form appears to seek reimbursement for 
medical expenses (R. 162, Addendum B). Connelly had no need of 
such reimbursement, because his medical expenses were all covered 
by his insurance and Utah victim reparations (R. 872). Connelly 
was unsure of what the form was for, knowing only that it was 
some paperwork sent to him for his signature by Allied 
Developement, his former employer (R. 872-73, 875). 
The form was signed by, and apparently prepared by 
Lester A. Perry, an attorney for Allied (R. 162, 872, Addendum 
B). The blanks were filled in by a typewriter and an "x" was 
handwritten in the space where Connelly was to sign (R. 162, 
Addendum B). The document was mailed to Connelly, and he, 
expecting a paper from Allied, signed it without reading it very 
carefully (it also contained an incorrect birthdate for Connelly, 
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which he did not notice) and sent it back the same day (R. 872-
75) . 
After learning of the form, defendant moved for a new 
trial, asserting that this newly discovered evidence was a prior 
inconsistent statement by which he could have "impeach ted] the 
credibility of . . . Connelly" and obtained a different verdict 
(R. 156-58). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
denied the motion (R. 865, 899-902). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a new trial, because the newly discovered evidence was cumulative 
and, at most, merely tended to impeach or discredit a witness, 
and because it would not render a different result probable if 
the case were retried. 
The trial court properly allowed the victim to show the 
jury the scars from his wounds. The scars were probative to show 




DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
BASIS OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WAS 
PROPERLY DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a new trial, because the newly discovered evidence was 
cumulative, merely tended to impeach or discredit a witness, and 
would not render a different result probable on retrial. 
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As noted above, the denial of a motion for a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion or reasonability. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 
545 (Utah 1994) (a decision "within the limits of reasonability" 
will be upheld); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991) 
("[w]e assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary"); see also State v. 
Becker. 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990). 
The substantive test for granting a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, set forth in State v. 
Gellatly, 449 P.2d 993 (Utah 1969), requires the new evidence to 
meet three criteria: "(1) It must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the 
trial; (2) it must not be merely cumulative; (3) it must be such 
as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the 
case." Id. at 995-96; see also James, 819 P.2d at 793. 
Furthermore, when new evidence "merely tends to impeach or 
discredit the testimony of a witness, . . . a new trial need not 
be granted." Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294; see also State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 851 (Utah 1988); Baker v. State. 755 P.2d 
493, 501 (Kan. 1988). 
While the application form could not, "with reasonable 
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial," 
defendant failed, in the hearing below, to establish any of the 
other requirements for granting a new trial. The "new" evidence 
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is merely cumulative, it merely tends to impeach a witness, and 
it would not likely cause a different verdict on retrial. 
A. The Evidence is Merely Cumulative 
The application form signed by Connelly is merely 
cumulative of defense counsel's several attempts to impeach 
Connelly by pointing out minor arguable inconsistencies in his 
prior statements. Examples of those attempts follow: 
1. Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's 
testimony that he had lived in Alaska for several weeks by 
referring to his preliminary hearing testimony that he had 
"always lived in Salt Lake City" (R. 447-48). 
2. Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's 
testimony that his vehicle was not in "park" when the first shot 
was fired by referring to his preliminary hearing testimony that 
he was "about to put the car in park" (R. 471-72). 
3. Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's 
testimony that defendant had said "This is it" just prior to 
firing the first shot by referring to Connelly's failure to 
relate those words in his preliminary hearing testimony (R. 473-
74) . 
4. Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's 
testimony that the lower part of his arm was capable of moving 
after being shot by referring to his preliminary hearing 
testimony that his "right arm was basically useless" (R. 475). 
5. Defense counsel tried to impeach Connelly's 
testimony regarding how far out of the vehicle defendant's body 
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was when he fired the last shot by referring to his preliminary 
hearing testimony on that subject (R. 478-80). 
In each instance, either defense counsel's attack on 
Connelly appeared to be inconsequential, or Connelly gave a 
reasonable explanation for the difference in his statements. 
Similarly, in the post-trial hearing the trial court found that 
Connelly gave a reasonable explanation for the minor inaccuracies 
in the application form (R. 901, Addendum D).2 
Had the application form been available at trial, it's 
effect would have been merely cumulative. It would likely have 
been viewed as simply another attempt, among many by defense 
counsel, to attack Connelly's veracity with an apparent, minor 
inconsistency. Accordingly, the discovery of this document does 
not justify a new trial. 
B. The Evidence Merely Tends to Impeach a Witness 
The application form in the present case, at most, 
merely tends to impeach Connelly. It is similar to the newly 
discovered evidence in Becker. There, criminal charges were 
filed against both Becker and Dalton. Dalton testified against 
Becker in his criminal trial. After trial, Becker discovered 
that Dalton and the victims had entered a settlement agreement 
prior to Becker's trial, wherein several civil claims against 
Dalton were dismissed. While recognizing that "the settlement 
agreement, if known to Becker at trial, could have been 
2The trial court found that the form was prepared by someone 
else, and that Connelly had signed it without carefully checking 
its contents for accuracy (R. 900-01, Addendum D). 
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appropriately explored in an effort to impeach Dalton's 
credibility," Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294, this Court noted that 
when new evidence "merely tends to impeach or discredit the 
testimony of a witness, as here, a new trial need not be 
granted." Id. at 1294. 
The supreme court has recognized the same principle. 
E.g., James, 819 P.2d at 794 ("the refusal to grant a new trial 
based merely on evidence of credibility will generally not be 
overturned on appeal"); Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851 ("newly 
discovered impeachment evidence does not ordinarily warrant a new 
trial"). 
It is important to understand the difference between 
this principle and the holding in the James case relied upon by 
defendant. There, where James was charged with first degree 
murder of his son, evidence surfaced after trial that a key 
witness had fabricated his testimony that he heard James confess 
to having killed the boy. The court found that evidence to be of 
a different quality than "merely cumulative" or "merely 
credibility" evidence, because it showed that the witness "had 
deliberately committed perjury" on a crucial issue. James, 819 
P.2d at 794. 
The statement on the application form in the present 
case is completely different than the evidence in James for the 
following reasons: (1) the statement on the application form was 
prepared by a third person and was not Connelly's direct 
statement; (2) there was no admission of perjury or intent to 
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commit perjury; (3) the trial court found that Connelly gave a 
reasonable explanation for having signed the statement; and (4) 
the statement, even if believed, still supports Connelly's trial 
testimony and refutes defendant's testimony.3 The statement is 
more comparable to the settlement agreement in Becker; it could 
have been used in a general attack on credibility, but is not a 
matter "sufficiently persuasive that the result of the trial 
might be changed." Becker. 803 P.2d at 1294. 
Because the statement on the application form is the 
type of new evidence that merely tends to impeach, and is not of 
the caliber of the evidence in James, it does not justify a new 
trial. 
C. The New Evidence Would Not Cause a Different Result 
on Retrial 
The trial court, having heard the evidence presented 
both at trial and in the motion for a new trial, weighed that 
evidence and found that the outcome of the case "would not be 
different with the additional information" (R. 901, Addendum D). 
"[R]ecogniz[ing] the trial court's advantaged position in judging 
credibility and resolving evidentiary conflicts," State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993), appellate courts 
3Defendant claims that the statement in the application form 
was "not merely cumulative but was independent evidence which 
corroborated [Quick's] statements." Br. of App. at 14. In fact, 
the opposite is true. Connelly testified that defendant shot him 
in conjunction with a job-related interview. Defendant claimed 
that there was no interview, rather that he and Connelly were 
negotiating an illegal drug sale when the shooting occurred (R. 
706-07, 710-11). The written statement corroborates the job-
related interview version, not the drug sale story. 
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"assume that the trial court exercised proper discretion [in 
determining whether newly discovered evidence merits a new trial] 
unless the record clearly shows the contrary." James, 819 P.2d 
at 793. 
The record supports the trial court's conclusion. 
While the outcome of the case depended on whether the jury 
believed Connelly or defendant, Connelly's testimony was amply 
corroborated by other witnesses, and defendant's was not. 
Furthermore, defendant admitted to the jury that he had been 
convicted of forgeries and frauds (R. 696), that he had used 
several false names (R. 693, 697-98, 733, 735, 737-38, 777-78), 
and that he had set up "scams" or "cons" (R. 703-04, 708, 731, 
835-36). In short, defendant's credibility with the jury was 
highly suspect.4 
Defendant's account of the shooting was that, while he 
had set up the job interview scam, he did not perpetrate that 
scam on Connelly. Rather, he maintained that, during a drug deal 
with Connelly and Connelly's "partner" involving the sale of 
thirty pounds of marijuana for $39,000, Connelly unexpectedly 
drew a gun and tried to shoot defendant (R. 766-67). Connelly's 
partner also drew and fired a gun (R. 769-70). However, alone 
4Even defense counsel, in closing argument, recognized that 
defendant's story was not believable. Counsel told the jury "you 
can probably understand that from hearing [defendant] testify, he's 
articulate, he's bright. Do you think if he was lying to you, just 
making up a story, he couldn't come up with something better than 
this?" (R. 836). 
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and unarmed, defendant escaped without injury, while Connelly was 
inexplicably shot by his partner three times (R. 770-72). 
This story was not corroborated by a single witness. 
No evidence corroborates the existence of the 3 0 pounds of 
marijuana (R. 723), the $39,000 (R. 722), the existence of 
defendant's co-conspirators in the alleged drug deal (R. 705-06, 
744-46, 752-54), the mysterious partner supposedly accompanying 
Connelly (even though defendant and Connelly were seen together 
minutes before the shooting) (R. 717, 504-06), or defendant's 
alleged "numerous" other meetings with Connelly (R. 707). 
On the other hand, Connelly's assertion that he was 
shot in connection with interviewing for a job with defendant, 
posing as "T. L. Stevens," is confirmed by several sources. 
Perhaps the most significant is defendant's own admission that he 
was, in fact, posing as "T. L. Stevens" and was running a job 
interview scam from the Little America Hotel, where he also met 
with Connelly (R. 703-05, 711, 758-59, 738-39). Also striking is 
that Connelly just happened to need a new job and just happened 
to have the sales and marketing experience specified in the phony 
advertisement (R. 219-20, 381-84, 703-04), as is defendant's 
statement to Diane Poland that he was about to interview a man 
(whom he admitted at trial was Connelly) for the job (R. 355-56, 
753-56) . 
Connelly's assertion that he was interviewed by 
defendant for a job is further supported by the similarity in the 
details of his interview and Diane Poland's interview with 
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defendant immediately prior. Both Connelly and Poland reported 
that the interviews were "long," nearly two hours (352, 359, 
3 90); both stated defendant claimed to be with Monsanto Chemical 
Company (R. 347, 353-54, 385); both were told they would have to 
do training in St. Louis, Missouri (R. 350, 354-55, 392, 395); 
defendant mentioned an interest in expensive cars to both (R. 
352, 391A); and both were told they would have to pass a security 
check (R. 359, 393) . 
Had Connelly been making up the job interview, his 
account of the interview could not have coincided in such detail 
with Ms. Poland's account. 
Additionally, in Connelly's several statements to 
police officers immediately after being shot, he consistently 
told the officers he had been shot by a "T. L. Stevens," who had 
interviewed him for a job at Little America Hotel, while driving 
the person to a business on the way to the airport (R. 515-17, 
533-35, 671-74) . These statements were consistent with his trial 
testimony. 
Finally, Connelly's account of how the shooting 
occurred was consistent with the physical evidence at the scene 
(blood spatters, empty shell casings, his clothing, and the 
location of the wounds) (R. 407, 411-14, 418-21, 423-24, 428-30, 
519-20, 531-33, 537-40, 559-63, 566-67, 583-84, 588, 590-91, 594, 
597, 600, 614, 687-88). 
In the face of such a divergence in credibility and 
corroboration, the trial court was correct in holding that the 
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minor inaccuracies in the document typed by a third person would 
not have produced a different verdict on retrial. Accordingly, 
defendant's motion for a new trial was properly denied. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING THE 
VICTIM TO SHOW THE JURY THE LOCATION OF HIS 
INJURIES 
The precise location of Connelly's wounds was probative 
to corroborate his account of how he was positioned when the 
shooting occurred. Because the scars were not gruesome or 
otherwise unfairly prejudicial, showing them to the jury was 
proper under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Even had it been 
improper for the jury to see the scars, the error was harmless. 
A. Standard of Review 
A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 4 03 
will be overturned only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
State v. White, No. 930696-CA, slip op. at 4 (Utah App. August 
17, 1994). This means that the trial court has "considerable 
freedom in applying [Rule 4 03] to the facts, freedom to make 
decisions which appellate judges might not make themselves ab 
initio but will not reverse," Id. (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 937 (Utah 1994), unless the ruling "was beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Id. (citing State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23, 28 (Utah 1994); Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239-40). 
B. The Rule 403 Balancing Test 
The record does not indicate that the victim's scars 
were gruesome, or that they were of such a nature as to provoke 
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an emotional response or otherwise cause unfair prejudice. At 
any rate, the probative value of the jury viewing the precise 
location of the victim's injuries outweighed any potential for 
unfair prejudice. 
Rule 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides for the 
exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." This occurs when 
the evidence has an "undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis [such as] an emotional one," State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1989) (quoting M. Graham, Handbook of Federal 
Evidence § 403.1, at 178 (2d ed. 1986)), or "appeals to the 
jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, [or] provokes its 
instinct to punish." Id. (quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 
961, 972-73 (3rdCir. 1986)). 
Prejudicial Effect. Defendant concedes that Connelly's 
scars do not fit into any of the categories of evidence having an 
"unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead 
the jury." Br. of App. at 19-20 (quoting State v. DiBello. 780 
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989)). Thus, "the usual Rule 403 analysis 
applies, and a presumption exists that the evidence is 
admissible." White, slip op. at 6; State v. Moore. 788 P.2d 525, 
527 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); 
DiBello, 780 P.2d at 1229. 
Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that 
Connelly's wounds were disfiguring, grotesque, or otherwise 
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likely to provoke an emotional response such as horror or pity. 
There has been no showing of a significant prejudicial effect. 
Probative Value. The location of the scars, 
particularly those in the abdomen, was highly probative of the 
direction of travel of the shots. This was important 
corroboration of Connelly's testimony of his position at the time 
of the second and third shots, which testimony was highly 
disputed by defendant. 
Defendant's theory was that Connelly was lying about 
who shot him and how it occurred. To support this, defense 
counsel cross-examined Connelly repeatedly and extensively about 
the position of his body when each shot was fired (R. 476-80, 
483-89, 491-93, 496-97), then asserted in closing argument that 
the angle of the shots, as judged from the wounds, was 
inconsistent with Connelly's testimony (R. 826-28, 838, Addendum 
C) . 
The general location of Connelly's wounds was 
established by other witnesses, but none of those witnesses took 
exact measurements or made diagrams from which angles could be 
computed, nor did they give opinions or conclusions as to the 
probable angle of the shots (R. 512, 520-22, 532). To make those 
assessments, it was important for the jury to see the scars of 
the entry and exit wounds, particularly those for the abdominal 
bullet. Only then could the jury properly evaluate defense 
counsel's claims that the angle was "really not consistent at all 
with" Connelly's testimony (R. 826, Addendum C), and that "[i]t's 
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just not physically possible. It just doesn't match what 
[Connelly] said" (R. 828, Addendum C). 
C. Harmless Error 
Even had the jury's viewing of Connelly's scars 
constituted error, it was harmless. An error is harmful only 
"when a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant," Whrte, 
slip op. at 8 (quoting DiBello, 780 P.2d at 1230), or when the 
court's "confidence in the outcome is undermined." Id. 
The following factors contribute to the conclusion that 
the error, if any, was harmless: 
1. The noninflammatory nature of the scars; 
2. The evidence of Connelly's wounds was not exploited 
or even emphasized by the State; White, slip op. at 9 (potential 
for prejudice was minimized by State's choice not to unduly 
emphasize or otherwise misuse the evidence); State v. Valdez, 748 
P.2d 1050, 1055 (Utah 1987) (any arguable error was harmless 
because of the "noninflammatory nature of the pictures and the 
lack of emphasis given them by the State"); 
3. Connelly's head and neck wounds were apparently 
already visible to the jury, and the head wound had previously 
been pointed out to the jury without objection (R. 4 07); DiBello, 
780 P.2d at 1230 (balancing the prejudicial effect of a gruesome 
video against the fact that the jury saw three other gruesome 
photographs whose admission was not appealed, the court saw no 
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reasonable likelihood of a different result absent the video); 
and 
4. The strength of the State's case against defendant, 
as evidenced by the plethora of corroboration for Connelly's 
testimony and the lack of corroboration of defendant's story, 
discussed in Point I above. 
The location and angle of Connelly's wounds may well 
have helped convince the jury that his testimony was believable, 
but the display of the scars to the jury did not cause the case 
to be decided on an emotional or other improper basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a new trial and properly allowed the display of the victim's 
scars to the jury. Accordingly, this Court should affirm 
defendant's conviction. 




q/ MARK ANDRUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another 
commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the 
death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life engages in conduct which creates a grave 
risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of 
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or 
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated 
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, child 
kidnapping, rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a 
child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child, or child abuse, as defined in Subsection 
76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 14 years of age, 
causes the death of another person other than a party as defined in 
Section 76-2-202; or 
(e) causes the death of a peace officer while in the 
commission or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer as defined in 
Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a 
lawful arrest as defined in Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses 
force against a peace officer. 
(2) Murder is a first degree felony. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion# or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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1 BY MR. STOTT: 
2 Q. Let me ask you this. I'm going to ask you 
3 to step down over by the jury again, one more time. Can 
4 you come down here? 
5 A. Sure. 
6 Q* Why don't you take off your jacket, would 
7 you please. I can hold it for you. Just pull that one 
8 off there, and I'll ask you to loosen your tie and your 
9 shirt. 
10 A* (The witness complied.) 
11 Q. Okay. Would you step over here so the jury 
12 can see. 
13 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may we approach the 
14 bench before we proceed further with this? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 (Bench conference.) 
17 BY MR. STOTT: 
18 Q* First of all, I don't know. Are you able to 
19 roll this up at all? Do you need some help? 
20 A. Yeah. 
21 I Q. Now, step over here. I believe you have 
22 your right arm out. Would you show the jury what was on 
23 the right arm. 
24 A* That's — this is the point which the bullet 
25 entered my right arm. It's about an inch and a half 
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1 below my shoulder. 
2 Q. What injury was caused to your right arm? 
3 A. My arm was broken. Shattered, actually. 
4 Q. Did it take very long for that to heal? 
5 A. It's still healing. I have about 80 
6 percent, 75 or 80 percent use of that. The bullet 
7 created a lot of shocks, so I lost a lot of muscle 
8 tissue and the bone has healed just slightly crooked. 
9 But it's -- they tell me it will be a year or so before 
10 I have what I'll get back, about 90 percent of that one. 
11 Q. Do you know if the bullet is still in 
12 there? 
13 A. Yes, it is. 
14 Q. They didn't remove it? 
15 A. No, sir. 
16 Q. So you still have the bullet? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 Q. Now, while you're facing the jury, can you 
19 show us on your head? What can you show us? 
20 A. The bullet entered right there below my 
21 temple and traveled down my neck. I was twisted over in 
22 the seat, as I said, and the bullet traveled down my 
23 neck rather than into my brain and exited — you can see 
24 a little hole there -- and then reentered and lodged 
25 against my clavicle, and that's the bullet that they got 
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Q. That bullet was removed from you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, this may be a little harder. Are you 
able to show us where the abdomen wound Is? 
A# Yeah. It's not that — I apologize, ladles. 
Q. Come over here. I don't know If they can 
see from right there. 
A. That round entered here and then exited over 
here. As I said, I was rather sideways in the seat, and 
it went here, and that's where they took it out, and 
so --
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may the record 
reflect in the process of speaking Mr. Connelly rolled 
up the right sleeve of his arm and was pointing to the 
scars as he was describing them, and that he unbuttoned 
the front of his shirt down to the waist and 
demonstrated to the jurors and pointed to the scars that 
-- to the scars that he was alluding to there. 
THE COURT: Yes. The record will reflect 
that. 
MR. STOTT: To the entry wounds, your Honor, 
and to the exit wounds. 
Thank you. 
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a recess for lunch till 1:30. So if you can be back 
here before 1:30 so we can reassemble and proceed with 
the rest of the case. 
We'll be in recess till 1:30. 
Just the admonition, again, please do not 
talk to anybody or get exposed to anything regarding 
this case. Little America is just a little over there, 
and don't walk over there to eat today or during the 
course of this trial. 
(Luncheon recess.) 
THE COURT: There are some matters that Ms. 
Remal would like to put on the record, so we will do so 
at this time. 
MS. REMAL: That's correct, your Honor. 
This morning when Mr. Connelly was testifying, I asked 
for an opportunity for Mr. Stott and I to approach the 
bench. That was just at the time that Mr. Stott had 
asked Mr. Connelly to step down in front of the jury. 
And I expected that what he was going to ask 
was exactly what he did ask, and that is that Mr. 
Connelly unbutton his shirt and show the scars from the 
wounds that he received. We approached the bench so 
that I could make my objection at that time to you and 
indicated that in my view that was objectionable, 
because it was more prejudicial than probative. 
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1 And I didn't at that time, I think, cite the 
2 rule, but I would at this time cite rule 403 which does 
3 talk about the exclusion of evidence that is more 
4 prejudicial than probative. 
5 The Court denied that or overruled that 
6 objection, indicated that Mr. Connelly might actually 
7 show the scars to the jury, which, in fact, he did. I 
8 just wanted to make sure that would be on the record 
9 THE COURT: That will be noted. 
10 I MS. REMAL: Okay, thank you. 
11 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 
12 MR. STOTT: Your Honor, Mr. Connelly will 
13 come back, and if I could ask him just another couple of 
14 questions is all. 
15 THE BAILIFF: Are you ready for the jury? 
16 THE COURT: Are we ready? 
17 THE BAILIFF: Ready for the jury? Robert, 
18 are you ready? 
19 THE COURT: Yes, we're ready. 
20 THE BAILIFF: Come on in now. All rise. 
21 (The jury entered the room and was seated.) 
22 May be seated. 
23 THE COURT: I#d like to just ask the jurors 
24 if they had any occasion to be exposed to anything 
25 regarding this case outside of this courtroom, or if 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
Salt Lake City, Utah (801)531-0256 
00445 
206 
melted into the fabric of the jacket. He didn't 
find that. That indicated to him that it was not a 
contact wound. 
The second wound that Mr. Connelly said 
that he had, the wound to the head, the wound that 
went essentially, from what I can understand, in in 
front of his right ear and down the side of his face 
and down the side of his neck, down by his clavicle 
is where the bullet lodged; that is the bullet they 
were able to extract during the surgery. 
What he told us happened just before 
that is that he was slumped over in the seat to the 
right towards the passenger side. And remember he 
kept demonstrating that for us and I kept trying to 
specify how far he had slumped over? And although 
you certainly must use your recollection, because 
your recollection is what counts, my recollection is 
he was slumped over maybe a third of the way. He 
wasn't slumped all the way over so he was lying down 
on the passenger seat. In fact, he said Mr. Quick 
was still sitting there at that point. He was 
slumped partly over and yet he received this very 
odd angle of a wound, an angle that's really not 
consistent at all with him being partly slumped over 
like that unless the shooter who is sitting next to 
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1 J him puts his arm and hand in a very bizarre and 
2 I awkward position that couldn't be designed to do 
3 J much of anything. 
4 I The third wound he said was the wound to 
5 I the abdomen. Now, you remember Officer Hawk, was 
6 J his name, the one that was present during the 
7 I surgery until the slug in the neck area was removed 
8 J and he said that the abdomen was the first one that 
9 I they dealt with, he was there. And he described the 
10 I wounds to us and actually Mr. Connelly demonstrated 
11 J the scars to you. And my recollection is that the 
12 I bullet went in somewhere in the upper part or the 
13 I middle part of the rib cage area and somewhere below 
14 J that breast and then came out somewhere near the 
15 I left side in a downward angle, 
16 J Remember what Mr. Connelly told us about 
17 I his position when that third shot was fired? He 
18 J told us that by that time Mr. Quick was out of the 
19 I car, moving out of the car because Connelly had 
20 I taken his own gun out and Quick was afraid of that, 
21 I so he's moving out of the car. And Mr. Connelly, 
22 I from the first two shots, is by this time, he says, 
23 I basically lying right down on the side of the seat. 
24 I Well, you tell me how the bullet when your right 
25 I side is lying against the seat is going to go in 
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1 I that side and come out the other side. It's just 
2 I not physically possible. It just doesn't match what 
3 I he said. 
4 I Now, he told us some other things. He 
5 I told us that he was shot three times while he was in 
6 I the car. All three times he was in the car. All 
7 J three times the gun was being pointed at him in the 
8 J car. And yet there is two shell casings found in 
9 I the car. We know from the officers who examined the 
10 J vehicle at the Wayne's Texaco, they found two in 
11 J there. The third one, however, is Exhibit 16, I 
12 I think it is, which is a picture of the car in front 
13 I of the Pax Company. A number of witnesses used this 
14 I to demonstrate where they found things. They talked 
15 I about that shell being found about ten feet out from 
16 J the curb, is what I remember Officer Snow telling 
17 I us, and way back down behind the car. Now, Mr. 
18 I Connelly told us that the car was actually moving 
19 J while all of this was going on, that he hadn't 
20 I gotten it into gear and it was moving forward. So 
21 I if anything, the third shell casing should be found 
22 I inside the car or if outside the car, right by the 
23 I passenger door forward from where this picture 
24 I shows. But that's not where that shell casing was 
25 I found at all. It was back here behind the car out 
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1 I sense. It would explain why Frank would have a gun 
2 with him. If you're going in for some fairly high 
3 I level drug deal you might have a gun. It explains 
4 I why there's blood and a shell casing outside the car 
5 I in a place that Mr. Connelly, at least as far as the 
6 I shell casing, can't explain. It explains why 
7 I there's no third bullet found in the car. All of 
8 J that makes sense if you think about Michael's 
9 I testimony where he says after he runs off from the 
10 I car he looks back and one person is out of the car. 
11 J And frankly, he doesn't stick around to find out 
12 I what they're doing or where they're headed next, 
13 I he's getting out of there as fast as he can. But it 
14 I makes sense that one person gets out of the car and 
15 I then the second person gets out of the car and for 
16 I whatever reason, they fight over the drugs and/or 
17 I the money and Mr. Connelly gets shot. He gets shot 
18 I outside of the car, that's why there's blood outside 
19 I the car, that's why the shell casing which comes out 
20 I of the gun straight up is outside of the car in the 
21 I middle of the street and not inside the car 
22 I someplace. That's why the bullet is not found in 
23 I the car. He didn't get shot in the car, he got shot 
24 I out of the car. 
25 I If you think about a third person being 
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1 I in the backseat, it also makes sense about the head 
2 I wound, the very odd direction of the bullet path in 
3 I the head wound. It would be exactly what could 
4 I happen if someone were in the backseat and they 
5 I stood up and were pointing the gun down, which they 
6 I could do from the back. It really makes sense when 
7 J you think about it and you put the details together 
8 I with what Michael told you. 
9 I It makes sense that the reason they 
10 I would be at Pax is because he's familiar with it, he 
11 J worked there and that's where he had the drugs. 
12 J That all makes sense. What Mr. Connelly said just 
13 J doesn't. 
14 I The police department did what they 
15 I could to try and track down what was happening. But 
16 I what they failed to do was investigate anything that 
17 I Mr. Connelly said. They took at face value what he 
18 I told you, what he told them. And Detective Howell 
19 I was quite honest about that. I asked him, did you 
20 I do this, did you do that, did you do this? And I'm 
21 I sure you remember, he shrugged his shoulders and 
22 I said, well, no, I didn't see any point in doing 
23 that. 
24 I He took Mr. Connelly's word that that 
25 I was his gun. That's why he didn't bother to 


















. a l m o s t d i e d . H e ' s j u s t a normal guy , a no rma l b u s i n e s s m a n 
2 j m i n d i n g h i s own P ' s and Q ' s . And h e ' s n o t on t r i a l . I t was 
3 I Mr. Quick t h a t was on t r i a l , and he was found g u i l t y by a 
4 j u r y . 
5 And I'd submit that's the way it should stand. 
6 THE COURT: I'll allow you to have an 
7 opportunity to respond to what he had to say, being the one 
8 who made the motion. 
9 MS. REMAL: Let me just respond in this 
manner, 
Mr. Stott indicated that since—that it would be a 
different story if we had a third witness who could come in 
and say that Mr. Connelly admitted he lied. Frankly, that 
seems like a distinction without a difference to me. 
What difference does it make if we have a person 
who says that he said something else happened or whether we 
have a document that says he said something else happened? 
But the important thing is that we have evidence that he 
said on another occasion something different happened. And 
I don't see what difference it makes whether that comes 
from a person or a document, it's still evidence, it's just 
as good as another source of evidence. 
THE COURT: In reviewing the arguments 
that have been made and looking at the document and hearing 
the testimony of Mr. Connelly, and sort of reviewing in my 
34 
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. mind the testimony that was given during the entire trial, 
2 the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be denied 
3 i at this time. 
4 I I think the testimony of both the defendant and 
5 Mr. Connelly were critical, but in addition, I think the 
6 cumulative evidence that was given at the time of the trial 
7 essentially supports the testimony of Mr. Connelly in regards 
8 to the events that had taken place and the statements that 
9 were essentially made by each of the witnesses support, in 
my mind, the activities that took place in regards to the 
defendant, the other witnesses and what finally transpired 
at the time of the incident of the shooting. 
The Court further is of the opinion that in 
Mr. Connelly's testimony, he indicated that this document 
was not prepared by him, but was sent to him, prepared by 
someone else. He reviewed it, did not review it very 
carefully. There are a number of mistakes that were in there 
that were not corrected. His explanation was that he would 
not have benefited from this particular document, himself, 
he does not know why Allied, you know, submitted this, and 
what, you know, would .have benefited them. 
He indicated that he was not employed as such, 
but was still an employee to the extent that he had 30 days 
in which to find new employment, which appears to me to be 
reasonable. That people, in many instances, are given some 
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time to find other employment when they are discharged from 
their job. And their primary job is to find another job 
because of their discharge. And that does not sound 
unreasonable to me, as far as his explanation is concerned. 
The distinction between this and the James case, 
one was a document with an inconsistent statement and 
another was an individual with—a third party that came in to 
testify. I think Mr. Connelly made a reasonable explanation 
of the difference in regards to the document, which was not 
prepared by himself, but by another party. 
But in reviewing the total case, the Court is of 
the opinion that the outcome would not be different with the 
additional information that was provided. I believe that 
Mr. Connelly reasonably explained the statements that were 
made in this application for hearing and the reason why 
those statements were made and why he did not appreciate 
the importance of making any changes and the fact that he 
didn't carefully read this because he was just told to sign 
this. 
The Court is of the opinion that, I think the 
important part of this motion is it must be such as to 
render a different result probable on the retrial of this 
case, and the Court is of the opinion that the outcome 
would probably not be different had this matter been 
brought to the attention of the Court and been heard by the 
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. jury, based on the testimony that's been given and the 
2 i evidence that's been submitted. 
3 I MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may I retrieve 
4 from the bench the copy of this transcript. 
5 THE COURT: You may. The record will 
6 show that Exhibit No. 1 has been— 
7 MS. REMAL: Oh, not this. This, the 
8 transcript. No, the exhibit may stay. 
g THE COURT: The transcript, yes. 
If there are no further matters, we'll be in 
recess. 
MR. STOTT: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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